In this paper I pursue two objectives: the first is to construct a model behavior of electricity demand in the IPEx, the second is to measure demand elasticity at hourly level, directly from consumer behavior. In the literature, demand elasticity estimation has been done constructing a residual demand curve, using the supply or offer bid data, in order to measure unilateral market power through the Lerner index. This paper takes a novel approach, providing the first attempt in the literature to estimate demand elasticity using demand data, in the IPEx, using duality approach to derive a hourly demand function for electricity. Econometric estimation allows to ascertain that elasticity varies significantly with time of the day, with day of the week, with the existence of line congestion and according to the level of the equilibrium price. Another interesting issue is how elasticity varies along the demand curve. Estimation results show that elasticity is generally higher and tends to increase in the portion below the actual equilibrium price. This means that more competition on the supply side can yield lower equilibrium prices and proportionately much higher quantities, because a lower offer curve, shifted to the right would intersect a flatter portion of the demand curve.
INTRODUCTION
Estimation of demand elasticity has been, ever since the foundation of modern economic theory, one of the most popular empirical exercises in applied economics. The relevance of knowing demand elasticity is quite obvious for advancement of research about consumer preferences and consumer behaviour, as well as for guidance to the adoption of policy measure, ranging from taxation to welfare. For instance, taxonomy of elastic vs. inelastic price response commodities is crucially based upon quantitative measure of demand elasticity.
In general, the typical data used for empirical estimation is market prices and quantities. This means that we observe one point along the demand curve in every state of the world realisation and identification of a (stable) demand function can be obtained using appropriate covariates in econometric estimation procedure. This is true whether one uses aggregate market data, pretending to infer a representative consumer's behaviour or one uses individual disaggregate data, coupling observed quantities purchased with market prices (Ref. ) .
Very seldom we find in the literature estimation based on data reflecting ex ante consumers willingness to pay, as it is stated in every Economics text book, for a whole range of price and quantity pairs.
As a paradox in applied consumer analysis, most of estimation using ex ante observed willingness to pay data are based on survey data, focusing on public goods and externalities, such as environmental quality, air pollution, social services rendered by local municipalities, public transportation and so on. So it is not unfair to say that, essentially, present state of the art in empirical demand analysis is focused along two alternative and partially unsatisfactory lines: on the one hand, there is estimation of individual preferences based on market data; on the other hand, there is survey of consumer intention to purchase "goods" for which there does not exist a market.
In this paper, I would like to present a novel approach for estimation of demand elasticity, using collected and well organised data for ex ante consumer demand schedule, based on a large data set of consumer price and quantity bids for electricity in an organized market. Notably, I use demand bids data in the day-ahead market in the Italian Power Exchange (IPEX). In this market, individual bidders on the demand side (for short, from now on: "consumers") send to market organiser a bid consisting of a pair of price and quantity for each hour of the following day; the quantity is the expression of the amount of KWh that consumer wants to purchase (and is kept liable to consume); the price is the expression of the unit value of KWh that consumer intends to pay for that quantity.
In the day-ahead market, consumer bids simultaneously price and quantity pairs for 24 hours, thus expressing a well defined willingness to pay for each quantity, presumably according to a complete and well structural behavioural strategy. Surprisingly, these data have never been used before to estimate demand elasticity, while many empirical analyses of electricity market have used producer bids for price and quantity in the day-ahead market (Wolak 2003b and 2010) and some have estimated demand elasticity from market equilibrium data.
These studies typically assume a specific market structure, i.e. oligopolistic behaviour and then compute residual demand for each market participant from which some parameter inference about (residual) demand elasticity can be recovered.
Therefore it is somehow surprising that "demand" behaviour is estimated from "supply" data, while there is a more direct and obviously way to estimate "demand" behaviour, i.e. using demand bid data. My critique to the above mentioned approach is that the notion of demand is the notion of "residual demand" facing an oligopolistic supplier which is obtained subtracting from total market ex post realized equilibrium quantity the ex ante quantity bid by individual oligopolist. There are two problems with this approach. The first problem is that each supplier bids in the ex ante day ahead market, without knowing total market demand quantity; each supplier can, at best, make a efficient forecast about "expected" market demand. The second problem is that computation of "residual demand" is conditional to the maintained hypothesis that suppliers behave as Cournot oligopolists.
It is evident from the above considerations that individual and/or aggregate consumer behaviour information is not used at all. So, there is certainly a loss of efficiency in using only suppliers bid data, plus a potential mis-specification issue in case of other-thanCournot behaviour in the supply side.
Some studies have used electricity market equilibrium data to estimate demand elasticity. An excellent survey of recent empirical work can be found in Estimation of elasticity price of electricity with incomplete information Xavier Labandeira, José M. Another relevant problem highlighted in the previous literature Is that "Electricity demand elasticities are a subject of nearly endless contention. The relevant elasticity would be a short-run elasticity in the sense of the customer's ability to respond to potentially large hourly price volatility, but still recognizing that customers would know well in advance that prices could be quite volatile. The actual elasticity will depend in great part on technology, as automated response to price changes will surely become easier", thus longrun elasticities might be larger (Borenstein CSEM WP 133, The Long-Run Effects of Real-Time Electricity Pricing, Severin Borenstein, June 2004) .
In order to identify a well defined demand functions in the electricity market, it is wise to notice that demand data are expressed by individual consumers in the IPEX in two different ways, distinction being crucially relevant for present analysis.
Some consumers express a quantity bid without corresponding indication of a price they would be willing to pay: these are consumers who show a perfect inelastic behaviour, as they are in principle willing to pay any price that would result from market clearing procedure. The IPEX market clearing procedure assigns a default price limit to these bids which has been varying in time, bat that heuristically reflects the maximum price cap to suppliers that is allowed by the Regulatory Authority within the market mitigation and competition policy measures. As a practical example in the last year (2010), to these bids there has been assigned a default price of 3000 euro/MWh. Some other consumers express a simultaneous quantity and price bid. These are obviously somehow elastic consumers, for they express a willingness to purchase a certain electricity quantity only if they can pay a certain well defined price. Obviously, when all individual behaviours are aggregated in a "market demand function", the shape of the demand schedule is a vertically down ward sloping curve until the portion of "elastic consumers" is reached, from this point onward demand schedule shows a well defined negative slope.
In principle, there are two possible market clearing outcomes, which are crucially relevant here. One possible market outcome is determined by intersection of upward sloping supply curve with downward sloping portion of demand curve (see fig.1 .A); another possible market outcome occurs when the upward supply curve intersects vertical portion of demand curves (Figure 1 .B). It is clear from these considerations that the concept of market demand elasticity is well defined only in the first case. It is therefore an empirical issue to classify market outcomes according to observed demand elasticity in order to make realistic conjectures about consumer behaviour.
The setup of this paper is as follows. Section describes the complexity of the IPEX due, primarily, to the geographical segmentation. Section three we describes the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes methodology, data sources and the build of our large data bank. Empirical results are shown in section 5, while section 6 concludes and summarizes main findings.
THE IPEX NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
There are some features of the Italian electricity market which are relevant to understand the operational way in which I have modeled the consumer behavior for practical estimation.
The Italian liberalization process began under the framework of the European Directive of energy sector liberalization, 96/92/CE with national legislation (Law 79/99) enacting a break down of the former vertically integrated monopolist (ENEL) to be realized through auction sales to the private market of three GENCO (new companies controlling about 50% of the existing generation capacity. In addition, there has been created by other legislation (Law 07/02 and 240/04) an Independent System Operator (now: TERNA), a Market Operator, (GME) managing a non-compulsory pool market and a a Single Buyer (AU) in charge of aggregating small and poor customer demand.
Similar to other countries (Newbery, 2005) , the Italian market has been organized as a sequence of three markets: day ahead, adjustment and dispatching resource market ("Ancillary services market"). The equilibrium price in the day ahead market is set as the system marginal price (SMP) for each zone in which the market is separated due to network congestion, as measured by excess of physical transmission capacity, based on supply and demand bids (Bollino Polinori 2007) . These latter are the prices received by the supply side, while on the demand side there is a unique national price, set as a weighted average of zonal supply prices.
The adjustment market allows generators and loads to correct parts of schedules which cannot be implemented due to technical constraints. Ancillary service market is a single market allowing the System Operator to procure congestion relieve and reserve margin resources, on a pay-as-bid basis.
Other main characteristics of the IPEX have been: (i) in the period April -December 2004 only suppliers were allowed to participate into the market, while demand was, inelastically, represented by the best day-ahead forecast of System Operator; (ii) in January 2005 active demand bids entered in to the market, while the System Operator maintained the privilege to bid in case of endangering of system reliability (i.e.,v when total market demand is "too different" from day-ahead forecast used for network security management; (iii) in January 2005 the AU was instructed to use contract for differences extensively and buy into the market. As a result, market liquidity rose to above 60%, due to AU dimension. (iv) in 2007 there has been a legislative attempt to reform the market, aimed at discouraging producer quantity withholding strategies, essentially "threatening" those generators found liable of market power abuse to be paid on a "pay-as-bid" basis, rather than receiving the "system marginal price". energy payment to a supplier, who withholds quantity aimed at exercising market power. Recently, this provision was repealed due to a Court decision. (v) in 2009 a new reform was announced, trying to change the price setting from the system marginal price to pay as bid, but the operational implementation is still pending.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In the Italian wholesale electricity market there are represented distinct groups of consumers, such as large consumers (energy intensive industries railways, telecom companies), industrial consumers, traders who typically intermediate residential consumers (households) In principle, residential consumers demand electricity in order to produce other flows of relevant services (such as heating, cooking and so on), to maximize utility, while industrial consumers use electricity as an input in the production function to produce goods and services, within a cost minimization process.
Using duality approach, in this paper I assume that for both residential and industrial consumers it is possible to postulate the existence of a cost function for using electricity as a good "e" and a composite numerary good "y":
(1) c = c (pe,py, x) where pe is the price of electricity, py is the price of the composite numerary good and x id the objective variable (utility for residential consumers, output for industrial consumers).
The easiest way to make use of the theoretical specification of function (1) is to consider "e" as the total amount of electricity used by the consumer in a given period. Considering that IPEX is a hourly market, I can refer equation (1) to the hourly cost function, from which it is straightforward to derive a hourly demand function for electricity, using Shephard's Lemma (time subscripts are omitted for simplicity):
(2) e = ∂c/∂pe = e (pe,py, x)
Demand function (2) expresses quantity demand for electricity as a function of own price, other goods price and the objective variable (typically, output). While it is formally legitimate, it could be unpractical, if not even unrealistic, to consider a hourly demand for electricity depending, among other things, from a hourly price of all other goods.
As stated before, use of duality allows to recover also Marshallian demand functions. It suffices to invert eq (1) into a inverse utility/production function, to obtain:
and then apply Roy's Identity to eq (3), in order obtain:
(4) e = -∂x/∂pe / ∂x/∂c = e (pe, py, c)
where, as before, in (4) pe is the aggregate price of electricity, py is the price of the composite good and c is the total consumer expenditure.
Equation (4) holds for each state of nature of demand. Typically, it is assumed to hold for each hour of an hourly market as it is the Italian market. The attractiveness of equations (4) is that it is quite straight forward to estimate and compute the elasticity of demand, with respect of both price and total expenditure. i.e price elasticity and income elasticity.
DATA AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL

Data
The data used are made available by the Market operator in electronic format. In this paper I use data from jan 2005 to sept 2011, discarding year 2004 data when demand bids was not operational. Each month amounts to about 1 million records, reporting, type of market, bid quantity and price, status of accepted or rejected, awarded prices, accepted quantity, status of marginal plant, zone, plant and producer ID, trader ID. There are seven geographical zones in Italy, which can be aggregated in homogeneous segmented zones according to the existence of network congestion. I define a homogeneous segmented zone in each hour a zone cluster characterized by the same SMP (NOTE: I exclude few cases of virtual zones which are defined as a single plant with limited production for grid security purposes).
I used STATA and TSP programs to select homogenous segmented zones and system marginal price (SMP), to identify all participants to each segmented zone, to compute aggregate demand for each segmented zone.
In the Italian market there were defined by the Energy Authority 4 different hourly clusters (NOTE: Hourly clusters are labeled F1 F2 F3 F4 and are roughly representing, respectively, very high peak load hours, daily peak load hours, weekdays off-peak load hours, night and weekend hours. This clustering has been used to perform market monitoring and surveillance by the Energy Authority. It has been modified and the dismissed in 2008). Market participants (and the Authority alike) expectations have usually been that in during peak (off-peak) hour period prices had necessarily to be higher (lower) than average. Thus, hourly clusters work like price signals, in the sense that producers embody the expectation that they could be somehow legitimated to charge higher prices in peak hours.
Market separation due to congestions occurs typically during peak hours. The number of segmented ones in each hour varies between one (no separation) and seven (each geographical zone constituting a segmented zone by itself). These latter extremes have very seldom occurred. The most common occurrences is that of two or three segmented zone markets (NOTE: Notice that this can imply different aggregations; for instance: "North and the Rest of Italy" and "Continental Italy+Sardinia and Sicily" are both feasible realizations of a two-segmented zone market. Obviously, not all combination of elementary zone in segmented zone markets are feasible: due to Italian transmission network shape (relatively long and narrow), only contiguous zones may be aggregated univocally along the North-South direction).
This implies that statistical market data for a given geographical zone result from aggregation of different market outcomes; for instance, the "average annual price in North" averaged out hours in which equilibrium price resulted from North market alone with hours in which equilibrium price determined by a larger market aggregation.
I analyze market data according to price quartiles, characteristics of maket operators, hourly clusters, geographical zone, market segmentation.
Italian demand for electricity shows the typical humped shape during the day and has not changed dramatically during the years (Fig 4.1) , with a long term average annual growth rate about 2% (except during the downturn period due to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009).
On the demand side the number of operators has increased in the first years and is now quite stable. With the exception of the Acquirente Unico (the Italian Single Buyer: a Government owned company which is in charge of purchasing electricity on the wholesale market on behalf of non-eligible customers and poor households), no operator has a significant market share (table 4.1). During the period considered, the first five traders share has not exceed 20%.
In Italy, electricity prices have been structurally higher than in the rest of Europe and have followed quite closely oil and gas price trends (table 4. 2). This Is not surprising, given that the Italian generation capacity is highly skewed toward hydrocarbons, which cover almost three quarters of total generation. Notice that zonal prices are quite different from the national average, due to differences in plant technology, network configuration and possibly generators strategic behavior (Bollino Polinori 2010) , see table 4.3).
Market zones aggregation due to congestion reflects demand levels and network operating conditions. In the period considered, market zones pattern has been quite stable, however, with some evolution due to transmission network developments which have been aimed at relieving congestions. During daily hours, the typical situation is three-zone segmentation: Continental Italy, Sicily, Sardinia. In peak hours, it is often he case that Center-North and Center-South break up into separate zones. The analysis of relative frequency of market segmentation (table 4.4) shows that roughly half of the times the Italian electricity market is split into 3 or more different zone, while Italy as a whole market (no segmentation) occurs only 2% of the times.
The Italian duration curves (prices and quantities) computed by market zones and hourly clusters confirm previous results (Bollino and Polinori, 2005, p. 8) , showing that price dispersion appears to be quite uncorrelated to load levels.
Econometric model
In order to estimate empirically the demand functions, there is need to specify a parametric functional form. Unfortunately, most studies (as an examples for all, see Labandeira et al 2011) depart from the theoretical structure and introduce a linear or loglinear demand function specification, which does not necessarily respect the theoretical restrictions of consumer theory, embodied in eqs. (3) and (4), namely, adding up, symmetry and homogeneity.
In this paper, I assume two different functional forms for consumer preferences: GAI (Bollino 1986 ) and LES (Klein-Rubin 1947) functions. The GAI (Generalised Almost Ideal Demand System) is derived from the original AI system due to Deaton and Mulellbauer (1980) and is characterized by the introduction of committed quantities, which constitute both a plausible theoretical assumption and a convenient empirical device for cross section estimation. The LES is a linear demand system with committed quantities.
I start with the aggregate electricity demand given by eq (4). I assume for simplicity that py=1 and that total expenditure C can be proxied by a group of relevant socio-economic determinants dj : C ≈ Σ βj dj.
The parametric form of eq (4) in the case of GAI can be written as:
(5) e = γ + α ln pe + β Σ βj dj
Where γ is the committed quantity parameter, α is the price coefficient and β is the total expenditure coefficient.
Econometric estimation of eq (5) can be easily performed and price elasticity can be computed as: ε = (∂e/∂pe).(pe/e) = α / e.
Estimation uses all observations referring to a definite and explicit price bid, thus excluding those observations for which the demand schedule is perfectly inelastic (i.e., those bids without a price).
Alternatively, the parametric form of eq (4) in the case of LES can be written as:
(6) e = γ + (α/pe ) ( Σ βj dj ) and price elasticity can be computed as: ε = (∂e/∂pe).(pe/e) = α / pe e.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
From the analysis of the Italian electricity market data I observe (Fig 4. 1, Tables 4.1 and 4.2) several facts.
Firstly, the daily profile is bimodal with a peak in the morning hours (around 11:00 12:00) and, especially in the Summer, a second peak around 19:00 20:00. In the Winter the second peak is much less evident.
Secondly, there exist some market concentration on the demand side. Apart from the bilateral contracts and the Single Buyer activity, which account together for about half of the total demand, there are the first four large operators which account for about 25-30% and a fringe of numerous buyers (around 70 -90) which account for the remaining 20% or less.
Thirdly, we observe that average market prices are increasing during the years according to the general energy price trend of the period while the difference between minimum and maximum price is quite large, for min price range around 20-25 euro/MWh, while max price reached easly the 170-200 euro/MWh range, with an exceptional value of 378 euro/MWh in july 2006.
Fourthly, we observe that zonal market separation due to congestion (table 4.4) is quite a structural phenomenon; the most frequent event is a two-zone separation, occurring 40-45% of the hours. Next, a three-zone separation occurs around 30% of the times, while no separation (typically, in off peak hours) occurs around 15-20% of the times.
Fifthly, we observe that zonal prices ( These Tables show the demand elasticity coefficients relative to different framework of analysis. Average monthly elasticities tend to be lower in 2011 than 2010.
Considering demand elasticity aggregated by day of the week reveals that Sunday elasticities tend to be the lowest in the week (around -0.01 to -0.05), while on Wednesday elasticity values tend to be highest (around -0.07 to -0.11). (table 4.7) Next, consider elasticity occurring in peak hours and off-peak hours. It is interesting to notice that the measure of elasticity varies significantly with time of the day. Demand elasticity aggregated by peak hours vs. off peak hours are quite different: during peak hours values are definitely larger, around -0.06 -0,08, while in off peak hours values are lower (table 4.8).
Demand price elasticity values are different according to marginal operator determining the equilibrium price (table 4.9).
Elasticity are differentiated as a result of the presence of congestion. (Table 4 .10).The first line refers to a market characterized by the absence of congestion (National Single Market), while the second one shows the elasticity computed in the presence of two zones, that is when the market is split in two ones, and so on, up to five or more zones.
Demand price elasticity are different when there are different market splitting in zone division due to congestion showing a U shaped pattern: values are lower when there is less congestion (no zone division), -0,04 -0,05 and increase up to -0,07 -0,09 when there are 4 zones, but decrease wioth 5+ zone division.
Demand price elasticity are different according to the absolute level of the equilibrium system marginal price (Table 4 .12). In particular, values show a U shaped pattern, with the peak at the 7 th -8 th decile of the price distribution.
Elasticity is also lower in the Summer in the last two years, possibly because consumers have acquired less elastic habits when the season requires air conditioning.
Another interesting issue is how elasticity values can affect market equilibrium. We have already understood that estimation results show that elasticity is generally higher (in absolute value) when there is congestion, in peak hours, in the Winter and in the North. This means that in these situations more competition on the supply side can yield lower equilibrium prices and proportionately much higher quantities, because a lower offer curve, shifted to the right because of higher competition, would intersect a flatter portion of the demand curve.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I addressed the issue of analyzing consumer behavior in the new Italian deregulated electricity market.
Data on market bids made available by the Energy Authority allowed us to compute demand elasticity for each trader on the demand side. Data are available are used over the period Jan 2005 -December 2011.
The estimation of demand elasticity form demand bid data is a new result in the literature.
The results of elasticity estimation for the Italian electricity market show clearly two main results, which are new results for the Italian electricity market literature; first, there exist a well defined and statistically robust value for the demand elasticity, which can be estimated on average around (in absolute value) 0.03 -0.10; second, elasticity values depend crucially on time of day and year and moreover from some characteristics of the market and of the zones. Notably, estimated elasticities are generally higher (in absolute value) when there is congestion, in peak hours, in the Winter and in the North.
This is important for competition fostering policies, because more supply competition resulting in a flatter offer curve can yield lower equilibrium prices, because the offer curve would intersect a flatter, more elastic, portion of the demand curve.
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